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1. Introduction: 
Public protests, riots and other mass incidents are on the rise in China, as the country moves 
into the 21st century with still breathtaking rates of economic growth. According to various 
sources, the annual number of registered collective protest incidents in China had risen from 
8,700 in 1994, to 58,000 in 2003, 74’000 in 2004, 90,000 in 2006, and some even account for 
127,000 such events in 2008, with an increasing peopoerion of them large-scale, i.e. involving 
100 or more participants  (see Shi, 2008, Tong and Lei, 2010: 488)(Cai, 2010: 30). Such pro-
test incidents include actions such as “disruptive collective petitions, strikes, protests, sit-ins, 
gatherings, demonstrations, traffic blockades, office blockades, attacks on state agencies, and 
confrontations with officials or the police” (Cai, 2010: 30) . While the number of publicly vis-
ible mass incidents have generally increased and sometimes even involved violent clashes, 
continued mobilisation of citizens at a smaller scale have equally gained importance as a form 
of “collective resistance” (Cai, 2010)  pursued by a variety of groups, most notably peasants, 
(migrant) workers as well as homeowners. China’s growing cities seem to provide a particu-
larly favourable environment for these forms of grassroot mobilisation, as the numerous ac-
counts of residents’ mobilisation at the level of the urban neighbourhood in China’s major cit-
ies testify.  
As spaces where human activities concentrate, cities have been at the forefront of economic, 
political and cultural change - throughout history and across the world. Cities are places 
where more general social phenomena and processes materialise locally, where they become 
visible and also easily readable. Indeed, cities are useful laboratories for social inquiry: they 
offer the double advantage of propinquity and numerosity, as John (2010) has aptly put it. 
Propinquity denotes the closeness of the urban as a ‘society en miniature’, which makes it a 
tractable unit for empirical research. Numerosity means the multiple occurrence of cities, also 
within single countries, that ensures variation in dependent or independent variables and ena-
bles rigorous comparative research designs. In this sense, we view the study of popular mobi-
lization in cities of China as a promising strategy to achieve a fine-grained understanding of 
the nature and the development of state-society relations in China more generally. We con-
tend that, as a social phenomenon, urban mobilizations in China are shaped by more general 
processes of change, triggered by the economic reforms started three decades ago. However, 
urban mobilizations are not only determined by such developments, they also contribute to 
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shaping these. Hence, looking at the ways in which urban governments react to and cope with 
popular mobilization at the city level will provide insights into the current workings and pos-
sible future transformation of the authoritarian regime. 
In this introductory paper we propose an outline of the theoretical arguments and the concep-
tual tools that will enable us to ‘read’ urban mobilizations in China in their wider context. 
Sections two and three aims to root the topic of urban mobilization in the wider literature on 
urban politics (section two) and social movements (section three). Section four pulls the ar-
guments together in order to reflect on the changing conditions that have influenced urban 
mobilisation in the Chinese context, by focusing notably on the transformation of political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, as well as newly emerging societal issues 
providing strategic frames for urban mobilisation. The paper concludes with some reflections 
on the relationship of urban mobilization and wider political developments in Chinese cities.  
2. Urban mobilization and urban social movements 
Questions related to popular mobilization in the urban realm are a classic theme of urban so-
ciology and politics (see Fainstein and Hirst, 1995, Mayer and Boudreau, 2012). Political pro-
tests and civil disturbances that have swept the American and European cities in the 1960s 
and 1970s made clear that city politics could no longer be seen as limited to (elected) political 
actors or organised business interests, playing out their influence within the formal institu-
tional channels of urban government. As popular protest rose in the American and European 
cities, it became clear that established political actors and formal political institutions had be-
come unable to cope with demands of increasingly splintered urban societies. Formally pow-
erless groups of residents and citizens had made clear that, by ‘taking to the street’, they could 
gain influence in city politics and become “agents of social change through their effects on 
popular consciousness and their actions challenging both the process and outcomes of social 
and political decision making” (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995: 181). In the literature on urban pol-
itics, the focus on collective mobilizations ‘from below’ is now firmly established for the 
analyses of urban conflicts and power struggles. 
In his landmark theoretical contribution to the theme, Manuel Castells (1983) introduced a 
view of urban mobilization as ‘new’ social movements. In an explicit rupture with the Marxist 
approach adopted in his earlier work on urban power (see Castells, 1972), Castells speaks of 
urban social movements in terms of cross-class alliances over issues of collective consump-
tion in the city. While ‘old’ social movements are rooted in the class structure and the materi-
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alistic antagonisms of industrial capitalism, ‘new’ social movements cut across classes and 
are oriented most often by non-material considerations. They aspire at transforming the 
‘meaning’ of the city, more than material aspects of urban life. For Castells, collective popu-
lar mobilizations in the city can be seen as urban social movements, when activism gathered 
around issues of urban public policies transforms into mobilizations that aim at transforming 
the existing hierarchies that structure urban life more generally.  
Castells’ approach on urban social movements has, however, been criticised for its assump-
tion that such movements necessarily aspire to overthrow existing structures of domination. 
Indeed, in much of literature of the 1980s and early 1990s on urban social movements, it is 
simply taken for granted that these movements pursue progressive goals and aspire to render-
ing collective consumption more egalitarian, to respecting and emphasising cultural identities 
and to realising political self-management at the neighbourhood level (Fainstein and Hirst, 
1995: 185). Hence, it has been argued that Castells’ somewhat teleological perspective on ur-
ban social movements’ goals should be replaced by a more pragmatic understanding of urban 
social movements as shaped by contextual conditions such as political institutions and cultural 
understandings. Pickvance (1985), for instance, has suggested to distinguish between four 
types of urban social movements according to the goals they pursue. A first type of move-
ments are those that mobilise around unmet demands of housing (e.g. squatters), and that 
emerge when authorities are overwhelmed by rapid urban growth. A second type of move-
ments is formed by people concerned about access and quality of public services. A third type 
is formed by movements that rally over demands for increased citizen participation in plan-
ning processes or service management. Last but not least, Pickvance suggests to distinguish a 
fourth type of ‘defensive’ movements, concerned with preventing projects of urban transfor-
mation. Often qualified as Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) mobilisations, these latter move-
ments completely lack the progressive agenda assumed in Castells’ definition. Their impact 
on the transformation of urban policies can, however, be quite considerable, as we have 
shown elsewhere (Kübler, 2000). 
In their recent comprehensive overview of the literature on the topic, Mayer and Boudreau 
(2012) show that this pragmatic perspective has increasingly taken hold in the study of urban 
social movements. This was particularly the case with North American scholars, whose work 
on urban mobilisation has increasingly blended in with wider social movement theory, con-
cerned with understanding the conditions that shape and enable political mobilization, as well 
as their interaction with the state (see section 3 below). Empirical studies have focused not 
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only on protest movements of urban minorities (e.g. ethnic communities) or interest groups 
(e.g. homeowner movements), but also on the role of identity-based movements in urban life 
(e.g. gays and lesbians). In this perspective, urban mobilisation is merely viewed as yet anoth-
er form of political contention that unfolds in relation to the (local) state. The core research 
questions formulated in this perspective are the following:  
“What are the effects or outcomes of mobilisation? How do urban movements in-
teract with state authorities? How does such interaction influence a movement’s 
choice of strategies and tactics? What type of resources do movements need in or-
der to be successful? Are protests or moderate strategies more likely to lead to pol-
icy change? And, finally, how does the political context in which movements de-
velop contribute to the success of failure of a particular mobilising strategy” 
(Rabrenovic, 2009: 240). 
More recently, however, scholars working on urban mobilisation on both sides of the Atlantic 
have re-emphasised the legacies of the earlier European perspective on ‘new’ social move-
ments that views social movements primarily as a force with transformative power (Mayer 
and Boudreau, 2012: 279). Drawing on Henri Lefebvre’s argument about the urban as a par-
ticular site of social conflict, culminating in fights over “the right to the city” (droit à la ville) 
(Lefebvre, 1968), they argue that urban social movements are engaged in struggles over dif-
ferent notions of urbanity, i.e. over conceptions of the nature of the city as an economic and 
social system epitomised in but at the same time shaped by its built environment. This not on-
ly includes mobilisation against inequalities or social exclusion of urban outcasts, but explicit-
ly also defensive struggles such as anti-gentrification protests, “in which heterogeneous actors 
seek to save a piece of urbanity or protect their alternative lifestyles”(Mayer and Boudreau, 
2012: 287). Hence, in addition to the more general questions on mobilisation in the urban 
realm as seen above, there is reason to argue that cities provide a specific context for political 
action that should be taken into account when studying urban social movements. Or more par-
ticularly: 
“What is it in urbanity that would energize political action? Is there a specifically 
urban way of acting politically […]? What is the emancipatory potential of the city 
today?” (Mayer and Boudreau, 2012: 287).  
In other words, the urban context is not only a space where contentious politics takes place, 
but at the same time an object of struggle. 
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3. Explanatory factors for protest mobilization 
Of course, the study of contentious mobilisation and social movements is by no ways limited 
to the field of urban politics. Since the 1970s, social movements have been extensively stud-
ied by political sociologists in a wide range of fields beyond the urban realm. Women’s 
movements, peace movements, anti-nuclear movements, LGBT movements, environmental 
movements, to name but a few, have been the object of sustained scholarly attention. The up-
shot of this “scholarly ‘growth industry’ in the social sciences” (McAdam et al., 1996: 2) is a 
quite integrated theoretical perspective and a coherent analytical toolkit for studying the 
emergence and development of protest mobilisation. This toolkit is mainly composed of three 
sets of concepts – political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing process-
es, which we shall briefly discuss one after the other 
 
3.1  Political opportunity structures 
The basic idea of the political process approach to social movements is that ‘political oppor-
tunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements 
on their environment’ (Kitschelt 1986: 58). Since Eisinger (1973) first introduced the notion 
of political opportunity structures in his study of protest behavior in American citites, students 
of social movements have distinguished between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ structures, that is, struc-
tures which allow for easy access to the political system or which make access more difficult. 
Open systems allow for more moderate strategies, and give the movements more influence 
than closed systems, where movements tend to radicalize and to have a difficult time to obtain 
some effect. Of course, if there is complete closure, such as in authoritarian systems, move-
ments of any kind will have a hard time to develop and to have any impact at all. 
Access for social movements to the political system may best be conceived as a two-step pro-
cess: as outside challengers, social movements first need access to the public sphere in order 
to draw the attention of the public to their cause. As Schattschneider argued a long time ago, 
the ‘expansion of conflict’ beyond those immediately concerned plays a crucial role in poli-
tics. Conflicts are ‘frequently won or lost by the success that the contestants have in getting 
the audience involved in the fight or in excluding it, as the case may be’ (1988: 4). Access to 
the public sphere means access to the media. A demonstration that is not reported in the me-
dia may just as well have not taken place. Typically, it is only when they get the attention of 
the public that social movements get a chance of getting some attention and support in the po-
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litical system. In the final analysis, the social movements seek, via public support, to have an 
impact on the decision-makers in the conflict in question. Creating controversy is a way of in-
creasing opportunity by opening media access to movement spokespersons and allies (Gam-
son and Meyer 1996: 288). If the attention of the public is a necessary condition for access to 
the political system, it is by no means a sufficient one. The movement needs to find allies 
within the political system who take up its cause and defend it in the venues of power.  
The core of the opportunity structures is made up of formal political institutions. In the first 
place, the degree of openness of the political system is a function of the degree to which it is 
democratically organized. Under the conditions of an authoritarian regime, access to the elec-
tronic media and the press is particularly difficult for social movements, which is why they 
are more likely than social movements in democratic societies to rely on new media for get-
ting the attention of the public. Moreover, in authoritarian regimes, it is very difficult for so-
cial movements to find allies within the political system, even if this may be less difficult at 
the local level, where urban movements mobilize. At this level, there may be sometimes a 
greater proximity between authorities and social movement challengers.  
The extent to which social movement actors obtain access to the political decision-making 
arenas also depends on more informal preconditions. Among them, we can count the prevail-
ing strategies of the authorities with regard to social movements, i.e. the procedures typically 
employed by members of the political system when dealing with challengers. We may distin-
guish between exclusive (repressive, confrontational, polarizing) and integrative (facilitative, 
cooperative, assimilative) strategies. These prevailing strategies have a long tradition in a giv-
en country and they are related to its institutional structure. Thus, political authorities in au-
thoritarian countries are rather more likely to rely on exclusive strategies than their colleagues 
in democracies. But even in democratic countries, these strategies vary a lot from one country 
to the other. Thus, authorities in consensus democracies typically use are more likely to use 
integrative strategies than authorities in majoritarian democracies. Among the more informal 
opportunity structures, we can also count the political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that 
determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion, and 
are held to be ‘legitimate’ by the audience. Koopmans and Statham (1999: 228) proposed the 
term discursive opportunity structure to denote this type of informal context conditions.  
Both institutional and informal structures are influenced by even more fundamental structures, 
which we should include in our conceptualization of the structural political context in the 
broader sense of the term. They include the country-specific structure of political conflicts, 
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and the country’s international context. In rapidly changing societies such as the Chinese ur-
ban societies, traditional conflict structures may be of lesser importance. However, even local 
struggles may increasingly be embedded not only into national, but also into international sys-
tems of governance open opportunities (such as international pressure on national or local 
governments) as well as impose constraints (such as pressure from the national government 
on local authorities) for social movement actors. 
 
3.2   Mobilizing structures and interactions 
Mobilizing structures include the organizational structures of the social movements, their 
modular action repertoires, as well as a range of informal social networks, the everyday life 
structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at protest mobilization, but where such 
mobilization may be generated (McCarthy 1996: 141). Movements are rooted in civil society 
and benefit from the social capital that exists in a given society – at the national or local level. 
‘Social capital’ is an (individual or collective) resource that is embedded in a social relation. 
Mutual trust between two people, or generalized trust between the members of a given neigh-
borhood would be examples of such a resource. To the extent that they trust each other, peo-
ple are more likely to engage in collective action.  
The boundaries of social movements are inherently disputed, unstable, and ultimately de-
pendent on mutual recognition by the members of the group involved. The people participat-
ing in a movement are somehow connected to one another and they share a common goal. Di-
ani and Bison (2004) propose that we speak of a social movement only in cases of conflictual 
collective action which is based on dense informal inter-organizational networks. No single 
actor can claim to represent a movement as a whole. Instead, a social movement is constituted 
by a network of multiple individual and organized actors who, while keeping their autonomy 
and independence, engage in a sustained, coordinated effort to achieve collective goals. 
This distinguishes social movements from organizations such as political parties or interest 
groups, who are more formally constituted. Parties and interest groups may be part of the 
network that constitutes a social movement, but movements cannot be reduced to them and 
they are by no means typical of the more recent movements. In the more recent past (since the 
1970s in particular), movements have increasingly been based on non-hierarchical, informal 
network structures. Their structure has been characterized by the term ‘SPIN’ – segmented 
(composed of many groups), polycentric (with many different leaders), integrated networks 
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(Gerlach und Hine 1970). While participation in formal organizations like parties has been 
continuously decreasing in Western democracies over the past decades, the readiness to par-
ticipate in such structures has continuously grown. 
What unites all participants in the dense, informal network is a shared strong common identi-
ty. Collective identities take shape on the basis of the informal networks and, in turn, reinforce 
them. Organizational and individual actors with a common identity no longer merely pursue 
specific goals, but come to regard themselves as elements of much larger and encompassing 
processes of change— or resistance to change. We do not speak of social movements in the 
case of ‘episodic’ events of protest or single campaigns that do not have certain duration in 
time. Social movements involve a protracted series of protest events produced by more or less 
stable networks of organizational actors. Clearly, there is a considerable variability in their ca-
reers and trajectories, as some movements do indeed last for a comparatively short time only, 
as with most neighbourhood NIMBY oppositions (‘Not In My BackYard’), while others en-
dure for decades, as with the labour movement or the women’s movement.  
The most distinctive of the three defining elements of the social movement is probably the 
collective action component. At its most elementary level, collective action consists of any 
goal-directed activity engaged in jointly by two or more individuals. It entails the pursuit of a 
common objective through joint action. To identify the specificity of social movements, it is 
useful to distinguish the collective actions that are characteristic for it. As it turns out, the 
modular action repertoire of social movements as we have known it for decades is currently 
undergoing rapid change. As we have learnt from the Arab spring, the mobilization by the In-
dignados in Spain, the recent social justice protest in Israel, and from Occupy Wall Street, the 
occupation of public spaces (in the form of tent camps) has become an important element of a 
new action repertoire of protest. At the same time, digital platforms and social media in par-
ticular have become key mobilizing channels. For the case of the Arab spring, a prelimnary 
analysis by Wilson and Dunn (2011: 1269) suggests that, while digital media use was not 
dominant in Egyptian protest activity, ‘digital media use – and social media especially – were 
nevertheless an integral and driving component in the media landscape’. This is particularly 
obvious in the role Twitter played in actively and successfully engaging an international audi-
ence in the Egyptian revolution. Similarly, Anduiza et al. (2012) show for the 15M demon-
stration of the Spanish Indignados that protesters were primarily mobilized by digital media 
and personal networks, and that formal membership in established organizations was much 
less important for their mobilization than for other, contemporary Spanish demonstrations. 
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3.3.  Framing processes 
The interaction between social movements and the authorities is the level where structures 
and configurations are linked to agency and action, and it is at this level that the strategies of 
the social movements and their opponents come into view. ‘Strategy’ is the conceptual link 
actors make between the places, the times, and the ways they mobilize and deploy their re-
sources and the goals they hope to achieve. In elaborating their action plans, the actors are 
taking into account and exploiting the rules of the game as well as the possible reactions of 
their adversaries. That is, strategic action is strategic interaction, ‘in which you face other 
players who regard you strategically, just as you do them, and engage in a series of actions in 
response to others, anticipating their reactions in turn’ (Jasper 2006: 6). Conceptualization of 
strategic action is particularly difficult, since in strategic action, as Jasper (2006: 171) points 
out, ‘there are few rules …. but many choices’.  
Movements differ with respect to their ‘strategic capacity’, i.e. their capability of developing 
effective strategy, which is determined by leadership and organization (Ganz 2000).  Diffe-
rences in strategic capacity may explain why some new organizations fail while others sur-
vive, and they may at the same time account for less adaptive behavior among older organiza-
tions. Movement actors will make their strategic choices on the basis of their appreciation of 
the specific chances of reform and threat, and the specific risks of repression and facilitation 
they face. As Gamson and Meyer argue, the definition of opportunity, that is, the appreciation 
of the concrete situation, is typically highly contentious within a social movement and they 
suggest that ‘we focus on the process of defining opportunity and how it works’ (1996: 283). 
The debates within movements typically turn around questions of ‘relative opportunity’ for 
different courses of action. Opportunity may shift in favour of some specific part of the 
movement, the radicals for example, and may result in a radicalization of the movement as a 
whole. According to the political process approach, however, the ‘relative opportunities’ are 
to a large extent determined by the configuration of actors and the structural context. In other 
words, the outcome of the internal debates of the movements is constrained by the larger po-
litical context, which the strategically oriented movement actors will not fail to take into ac-
count in their deliberations. 
In addition to the choice of the action repertoire, a particularly important strategic choice re-
fers to the movement’s message and they way to present it in the general public. This is what 
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is referred to by the concept of framing. Under contemporary conditions, information is not a 
scarce good, but the scarce factor is given by the attention for particular informations. At any 
given moment, the attention of the public can only be focused on a limited number of political 
problems. Accordingly, the struggle for attention constitutes a key element of politics more 
generally, and the goal of any social movement is to draw attention to its own cause. The rela-
tive strength of an actor’s frame as compared to his opponents turns out to be the most im-
portant dimension in this respect (Chong and Druckman 2007a). While the reasons why one 
frame is stronger than the other still need to be clarified, it has been suggested that, in addition 
to the credibility of its source, the strength of a frame depends on its resonance/congruence 
with central cultural themes (Chong and Druckman 2007b: 110, Entman 2004: 14). This may 
explain why populist frames appealing to the sentiments of anxiety, disenchantment and res-
sentiment of the ‘common man’ and his allegedly superior common sense have an advantage 
over more sophisticated frames. This may also explain why introducing considerations that 
appeal to widespread stereotypes as well as to the received wisdom in a given society is likely 
to have a strong effect, while innovative, unconventional or unexpected framing is likely to 
have little effect at all.  
But movements not only seek to get the attention of the public, they also try to influence its 
views on the issue of concern to the movement. Strategies attempting to influence the public’s 
views can either appeal to the public’s reasoning by providing persuasive arguments, or they 
can appeal to its emotions. Emotional appeals are communications intended to elicit an emo-
tional response from the public. The distinction between cognitive arguments or frames and 
emotional appeals is not as clear-cut as it may seem at first sight. Movements strategists must 
weave together a cognitive and emotional package of appeals to convince the public of its 
claims (Goodwin et al. 2001: 16).  
4. The changing conditions for urban mobilisation in China 
If we want to understand the intensifying urban mobilisation in China, we need to look to at 
the conditions for urban mobilisation relating to political opportunity structure, mobilizing 
structure as well as framing processes. In the following, we argue that a number of changes in 
all three conditions have taken place since the 1990s in China and that are particularly felt in 
the cities.1 
                                                 
1
  Our knowledge on these processes of change is, for the time being, incomplete. The following account 
is based mainly on the publications by Guo (2007), Shi (2008), Ren (2011) as well as Dong (2010). 
 12 
 
4.1 Political opportunity structure: decentralisation and the fragmented state 
 
Linked to the economic reforms is the overall trend towards decentralisation. According to 
some observers, central-local relations in China have seen subsequent waves of decentralisa-
tion. The economic reforms entailed decentralisation of decision-making within the state: 
property rights were decentralised to local governments, who thereby gained considerable 
clout in the system of intergovernmental relations. A second wave of decentralisation resulted 
from the relaunch of the economic reform after 1992. Some observers have described the cur-
rent situation as de facto federalism with negotiations between the centre and the sub-national 
entities being a core element of Chinese politics.  
This trend of decentralisation blends in with the measures taken by the Chinese Communist 
Party and the government to promote “good governance” (Guo 2007). This not only entails 
the improvement of administrative capacity, but also participative procedures of policy-
making, especially at the local level. Elections of village committees have been introduced in 
the 1980s, elections to urban neighbourhood councils in the 1990s (Dong, 2010) . In addition, 
city governments have increasingly incorporated urban residents into the government system 
of administrative control. Although these reforms have been initiated in a ‘top down’ way and 
remain somewhat limited , they open up opportunities for policy innovations associated with 
social dynamics in the urban society. 
In spite of its one-party regime, the Chinese state has become much more fragmented as a 
consequence of decentralisation:  “The authoritarian Chinese state is no longer as monolithic 
as it was during command economy […] The discrepancies among government agencies have 
expanded, which may result in conflicts within the administrative system” (Shi, 2008: 252). 
State control has become less stringent, which incites protest mobilisation outside the state 
apparatus.  
Decentralization opens up opportunities for citizens at the grass-roots. This is discussed in a 
paper by Liu (2008), who shows that state-led community governance reforms may provide 
institutional resource that promote civic engagement and neighbourhood activism. His study 
of such a process in Shanghai argues that the originally intended function of political control 
unexpectedly turned into empowerment by providing vibrant institutional spaces and re-
sources for local residents to broaden their horizontal interactions. 
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In addition, the large scale privatizations opened up opportunities for litigation. Thus, the pri-
vatization of housing has turned China into a country with one of the highest homeownership 
rates in the world. The landmark Property Rights Law, passed by the State Council in 2007, 
has further provided legal support for housing rights activism (Ren 2011). The expanded legal 
system has broadened the legal tools that citizens can use to defend their legally guaranteed 
rights.  
 
4.2  Mobilizing structure: new social constituencies, new grievances, new networks 
 
The market-oriented reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s have had consequences 
well beyond the economic sphere. More particularly, they have created a number of new so-
cial constituencies with their own grievances. Two of them are particularly important with re-
spect of urban mobilization: homeowners and migrant workers.  
The housing privatization reforms introduced in the 1980s have transformed large numbers of 
urban residents into private homeowners, and thereby created a constituency of new stake-
holders interested to influence policy-making processes at the local level. Additionally, the 
shift away from the work unit as the basic unit of urban governance has increased the im-
portance of residents’ committees in social interactions. Horizontal networks (e.g. homeown-
ers committees) have become more important in China. Under the slogan of ‘weiquan’, 
homeowners are increasingly prepared to stand up for their rights of ownership, often through 
non-confrontational action organized by associations of homeownership. Yip and Jiang 
(2011) trace the strategies that homeowners have used to create horizontal cooperation among 
such associations to defend the rights of homeowners. 
Besides the emergence of a new urban middle-class, urban mobilisation increasingly entails 
uprisings - and even riots - of urban have-nots. This includes, in particular, the mobilisation of 
groups pertaining to the large number of migrant workers who are present in many Chinese 
cities and who are often denied essential social rights. Indeed, the state is unwilling or unable 
to address labor rights abuses and to attend to the welfare needs of migrant workers. Non-
governmental organizations2 have increasingly filled this gap, mostly working in three areas: 
legal aid, delivering services (education for children, vocational training, medical aid), as well 
as building solidarity and networking. Even though these NGOs are all tightly controlled by 
                                                 
2
 See, for example:China Labour Bulletin, which records strikes on a daily basis. 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100001 
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the state, they have heightened their rights awareness and fostered collective identity of mi-
grant workers (Ren, 2011). A report published in January 2012 by the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) says that, compared with those in 2010, the strikes of 2011 were bet-
ter organized, more confrontational and more likely to trigger copycat action3. Protests have 
increased most rapidly in areas with rapid migrant population growth.  
How do workers engage in collective action where opportunities for formal organization are 
frequently denied, as is the case in China? In line with our general argument about social 
movement mobilization, Becker (2012) argues that in situations, where formal interaction is 
prohibited, protest is facilitated through the social capital of informal ties, which provide both 
material support and information. He provides evidence that ‘urban ties, links that develop be-
tween migrants with no prior connections before moving to the cities, provide information vi-
tal to action, helping workers learn of new protest options, navigate formal institutions, con-
nect with others sharing similar disputes, and identify additional resources’ (p. 1381f.). 
Hence, community networks are forming in China’s cities - not only within the new middle 
class, but also among migrant workers - thereby providing “micro-mobilization contexts” 
(McAdam, 1988) and the social capital for these groups that influence their propensity and 
capacity for collective action.  
 
Most importantly perhaps, the advent of the new media provides a whole range of new tools 
for the organising of collective action. In the past three decades, China has seen a dramatic 
change in its media system. Not only has there been an increase on the number of mass media 
outlets. The revolution in global information technology has also made the internet, e-mail 
and cell-phones widely available.  
Today, China is the country with the largest number of “netizens” in the world (500 million). 
The internet undoubtedly is a major channel for public debate in China. The flow of infor-
mation in all kinds of media has exploded. As a consequence, Chinese citizens show more in-
terest in and have more knowledge of political affairs. For the government, the internet also 
provides a valuable means to understand public opinion, to implement policies, and to moni-
tor unresponsive public services or corrupt officials. The new, digital action repertoire has 
reached China as well, and holds out great promise for the mobilization of citizens in China. 
Thus, Zheng and Wu (2005) argue that, in addition to providing alternative sources of infor-
mation and to promoting the public sphere and civil society, the Internet can be used as an ef-
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fective tool to organize collective action. In China, the Internet has not led to the development 
of an autonomous civil society. Nevertheless, there are successful collective political actions 
via the Internet. Examples cited by Zheng and Wu include the mobilization against the SARS 
epidemic in November 2003 in Guangdong province, the death of Sun Zhigang in March 
2003, and the Sun Dawu event in May 2003, which led to major concessions on the part of the 
responsible government. 
However, the authorities are learning fast how to counter this new, web-based mobilization 
strategy. As is observed by Dalacoura (2012: 69) and Anderson (2011), the hype which has 
surrounded the use of social media in the Arab spring in particular obscures the fact that gov-
ernments used them for their own purposes or simply shut them down. For instance, in the 
weeks leading up to the fall of Mubarak internet access was often blocked in Egypt. The Chi-
nese example documents the capacity of authorities to adapt to the possibilities of the new 
media. As MacKinnon (2010) points out on the basis of the Chinese example, authoritarian 
regimes rapidly learn how to deal with these new media and pour unprecedented resources in-
to building their capacity to influence and shape digital communications networks in direct 
and indirect ways. The internet may even enhance the life of authoritarian regimes, by provid-
ing them with deliberative venues to bolster regime legitimacy (He and Warren 2011). 
MacKinnon (2011: 44) suggests that without some baseline conditions of rule of law, trans-
parency and accountability, opposition, dissent and reform movements ‚will face an increas-
ingly uphill battle against progressively more innovative forms of censorship and surveil-
lance‘. In other words, there is certainly no easy technological fix to overcome the obstacles 
to political mobilization.  
 
4.3 New frames that resonate?  
The strength of protest mobilizations not only depends on political opportunities and mobiliz-
ing strucutures, but also on the cognitive and emotional performance of the package of ap-
peals that is woven together to convince a larger audience and attract allies. Protesters thereby 
seek to connect their claims in a way that resonate with wider frames known to gather public 
attention. Our knowledge about such strategic framing of urban mobilization in China is in-
complete. However, there is evidence of a number of new societal issues that find resonance 
in the wider Chinese public, and to which protest mobilization has tended to connect.  
 16 
Cai (2010: 197) has emphasised two such frames: citizens’ rights, as well as the misconduct 
of local officials (i.e. abuse of power or corruption). Indeed, discussions of citizens’ rights are 
quite common in the Chinese media. As information flows have improved, reports of cases of 
violations of citizens’ rights are more common. This has heightened citizens’ awareness of 
their rights and their knowledge of (legitimate) ways to protest against violations of these 
rights. Similarly, examples of misconduct of local officials are also widely debated in the me-
dia. Abuse of power or corruption by local governments are not only regarded as unaccepta-
ble by the wider public, but also by higher level governments. Focusing on misconduct, abuse 
of power and corruption of local officials can thus be seen as a promising way of framing pro-
test claims in urban mobilization (Cai, 2010: 189). Guobin Yang, in his study on online activ-
ism in China, has suggested that the protection of the environment, as well as consumer-rights 
are also powerful frames that resonate well with the wider audience (Yang, 2011: 94 ff.). 
Claims relating to environmentalism and consumer-rights activism are congruent with gov-
ernment goals – sustainable development; product safety – and therefore widely debated in 
the Chinese media. Hence, in order to fully grasp the relationship of urban mobilizations to 
the wider political culture, it would be necessary to focus to what extent such mobilizations 
are strategically framed in order to connect to wider societal issues such as citizens’ rights, 
consumer rights, environmental protection, the fight against misconduct of local officials, or 
others.  
 
5. Conclusion: urban mobilisations and political devleopment in China 
The goal of this paper was to formulate an analytical perspective for understanding urban mo-
bilizations in China. In order to do so, we suggest to draw on three well-known concepts of 
social movement theory, namely political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, as 
well as framing strategies. We argue that changes that occurred since the onset of economic 
reforms in China have influenced the conditions for urban protest mobilization at all three 
levels. The use of the new media is crucial in this context, as the new media not only provide 
a new element in mobilizing structures, but have also contributed to raising the consciousness 
of the wider public for societal issues that can be used in framing strategies by protest mobili-
zations. Of course, our knowledge of these conditions is incomplete and our conclusions can 
therefore only be tentative at the moment. 
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In general, the Chinese party-state has proved quite resilient against protest mobilization up to 
now. In spite of recurrent protest events throughout the country, citizens in general tend to 
have a high level of trust in the Chinese central government (Cai, 2010: 194). Nevertheless, 
the steady increase in protest events over the last years clearly shows that the existing mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution clearly have their limitations.  
In order to understand the transformative power of urban mobilization in China, it is im-
portant to assess its impact. According to Cai, ‘many instances of collective action in contem-
porary China do not qualify as social movements because they are, with few exceptions, short 
lived and are not sustained challenges against state authority” (Cai, 2010: 184). Urban mobili-
zations in China are often limited, specific and clear to state authorities – they are in most 
cases non-political or non-regime threatening. But this is not to say that they remain without 
effects. Indeed, the Chinese government pays close attention to the outbreak of social protests 
and instability. Responses typically consist in compensation to injured parties, as well as pun-
ishment of officials or agencies directly responsible for popular grievances. The goal is to 
handle protest locally - thereby again emphasising the role of the local level. Thanks to decen-
tralisation, local authorities have indeed considerable discretion in choosing their strategy of 
handling protests. Many local officials show a pragmatic behaviour guided by a ‘trouble-
saving mentality’ (Cai, 2010. 192). True, many local governments throughout China have 
tightened control and increased repression of protest – a strategy which is supported by the 
central government. There are others, however, that have implemented new channels of con-
tact and deliberation between the authorities and citizens. Hence, it would be interesting to in-
vestigate the reasons for these differences in strategies. In addition, it is evident that  major ef-
forts have recently been devoted, by many city governments in China, to developing internet 
based tools (e-government) deemed to increasing the possibilities of staying in touch with 
their citizens. Hence it is important to understand the role of these internet-based tools play in 
shaping state-citizen relationships in China. Indeed, as Manuel Castells has aptly put it 
(2000), the electronic media have become the new space of politics in the 21st century. 
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